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Psychological living implies living in a fantasy, a story, 
being told by a myth (Hillman, 1997: 143)
THOMAS MANN BETWEEN CARL GUSTAV 
JUNG AND JAMES HILLMAN
Many years ago I discovered purely by chance –if  
we can speak of “chance” in the context of Jungian 
thought1 – the exceptional value a work of art, more 
specifically a literary work, can have in discussions 
about the veracity, or at least the verisimilitude, of 
a psychological theory like that formulated by Carl 
Gustav Jung. To be more precise, I should qualify 
the words “veracity” and “verisimilitude” as “his-
torical” and “cultural”; nothing is further from my 
intentions, and indeed those of Jung, than to sustain 
a philosophia perennis ac universalis. I shall explain 
briefly how this discovery occurred and how I intend 
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to make it a methodological point of departure for 
this new study.
The surprise to which I refer was the recognition 
of the unending psychological event referred to by 
Jung as the “process of individuation” in some of 
the major novels by Austrian writer Gustav Meyrink 
(1868–1932) (Montiel, 1998, 2012). The most excit-
ing aspect of the discovery lay in the fact that the 
literary description of the process and the most 
significant archetypal figures appearing in it (the 
shadow, the anima, the senex, etc.) preceded their 
appearance in Jung’s texts by several years, so the 
writer could not possibly have created them based 
on previous knowledge of Jungian theories. Jung 
himself  recognised in his work the psychological 
interest of Meyrink’s novels from what he termed 
the “visionary” view of artistic creation (Jung, 1960–
1983, 15: § 139, § 142; 12: § 53, § 103, § 341 n. 22; 7: 
§ 103, § 153, § 520; 9/1: § 405 n. 22; 14/3: § 592 n.3, 
§ 650 n. 70; 6: § 205, § 426 n. 163, § 630), pointing out 
that Meyrink could not have learnt from him what 
coincided with his own thought (Jung, 1960–1983, 
7: § 153).
Something similar happened to me recently. In 
my role as medical historian, with a special interest 
in the history of psychology and mental illness, and 
having devoted many years to studying the work 
of Jung, I have been drawn to different develop-
ments of his ideas and have found James Hillman’s 
 archetypal psychology of particular interest.2 And 
once again I have encountered the fascinating case 
of an artist who is able, based only on his own sensi-
tivity, to “illustrate” a theory with his work, a theory 
that is formulated decades later, leading us to talk of 
a work that is “prospective” if  not “prophetic”.
There is no reason for us to fear this word, espe-
cially as I have placed it between inverted commas 
(the tool of irony) with a view to stripping it of all 
grandiloquence and also because all those who are 
familiar with Jung’s work know that, for him, the 
most authentic creations of the human spirit in an 
age breathe the same air, each expressing it in its own 
language, so that the artist, just like the psycholo-
gist, perceives what is in the air and brings it forth 
with his or her own means, sometimes earlier than 
the latter. Psychology and poetry, to play on the title 
of a work by Jung, are two manifestations, among 
others, of the individual and collective psyche, and 
it is logical that they should complement each other 
when they are genuine; or we could say that their 
similarity leads us to think they may be genuine and 
may reveal truths about a moment in history.
The new discovery to which I refer is based 
on a late work by Thomas Mann, his last, unfin-
ished novel Bekenntnisse des Hochstaplers Felix 
Krull (Confessions of Felix Krull, Confidence Man). 
Although I have described it as “late”, this is not 
altogether accurate. Mann had the original idea in 
1906 and worked on the novel from 1910 to 1913 
but only decided to finish it towards the end of his 
life, after 1951. However, he soon realized that the 
dimensions this work was taking made it difficult 
to complete his plan, so he decided to publish what 
he had already written before his death (Kern, 2006: 
20). From the perspective I shall be adopting in 
this analysis, many of the really decisive elements 
were already present at an early stage, in Buch der 
Kindheit (The Book of Childhood), published in 
1922–1923.3 Considering that the rest of the work 
was published in 1954 and that Mann died in 1955, 
nine years before Hillman’s first work, Suicide and 
the Soul, was published, I think it is justifiable to 
apply to Krull the methodology I previously applied 
to Meyrink’s novels, in support of the same hypoth-
esis. What I hope to do is to show the similarity 
between the poetic thought of Thomas Mann and 
the psychology of James Hillman from a view-
point which in no way presupposes a dependence 
by the artist on the thinker, and which allows us 
to present the creative work as involuntarily (and 
more importantly for this very reason) supporting 
psychological theory.4
With the above comments I would not wish to 
claim that Thomas Mann was absolutely original or, 
in the most extreme sense of the word, a genius. The 
fact that Hillman is indebted to Jung allows us to 
identify the work of the latter as a common source, 
which makes the approach I propose more realistic, 
since the influence of Jung’s work on that of Mann 
has been satisfactorily demonstrated (Dierks, 2000). 
Paul Bishop has carried out a detailed analysis of 
Jung’s influence in the four-part novel Joseph und 
seine Brüder (Joseph and his Brothers) and it should 
not be forgotten that part of the work on Krull coin-
cided with the writing of this novel.5
The archetypal model on which the figure of Felix 
Krull is based is that of the göttliche Schelm, the 
Trickster, which, in the frame of Junguian psychol-
ogy, Paul Radin and Karl Kerényi, Mann’s son-in-
law, started to define in those same years. However, 
it is no less clear that the work specifically devoted to 
this figure, referred to in the preceding note, cannot 
be considered to lie behind the creation of the figure 
of Felix Krull purely for chronological reasons.6 We 
could speak here of the natural development, on 
the one hand of an idea of the psychologist which 
matured over years, particularly in the context of his 
work with religious researcher Karl Kerényi, Mann’s 
son-in-law, and, on the other, of the stylisation of 
the figure of Hermes,7 which had captivated Thomas 
Mann from the earliest stages in his literary work. 
We have only to recall the mention of the “liebliche 
Psychagog” –the lovely psychagoge- (Mann, 1978: 
68), the charming leader of souls, in the closing 
lines of Der Tod in Venedig (Death in Venice, 1912). 
However, in the course of the narrative I believe I 
have detected other developments which, in this 
case, seem to foreshadow some of those we find in 
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Hillman’s work, giving it a distinctive character. I 
refer specifically to the aspects which serve Hillman 
to rehabilitate the central role of the figures, or the 
images, of Greek mythology in his proposal for a 
polytheistic psychology8 in which the ego has dis-
tinctly less weight than it had in Freud’s psychology 
and, to some extent, even less than in Jung’s. This is 
the approach to the novel I propose in this analysis. 
I believe, moreover, that my proposal is faithful to 
the American psychologist’s thinking. In one of his 
works he upheld the need to “tell two types of story 
about the nature of things” to understand them fully 
and not from a single viewpoint. These two narra-
tives would use “the language of the psyche” and 
“the discourse of the soul”, respectively. The distinc-
tion is comparable to that between logos and mythos 
or the distinction the Romantics made between 
the “diurnal” and “nocturnal” sides of the soul 
(Hillman, 1998: 119–120). In another major text he 
upheld the need to study the soul through alterna-
tive routes to psychopathology, one such route being 
the arts (Hillman, 1997: 107).
FELIX KRULL, A TWENTIETH CENTURY 
HERMES
The first pages of the narrative seem intended to 
offer the reader some references, some keys to read-
ing, which refer to a mythical domain, the Hellenic, 
and, more precisely, the Dionysian. From his Latin 
name the main character in the fictitious autobiogra-
phy would seem to be destined for happiness, but this 
name only takes us a short distance from the Greek 
world, probably only in deference to readers. We are 
soon to learn that he is surrounded by subtle Greek 
presences: his sister’s name is Olympia (Mann, 
2012: 21) and when she decides to go on the stage 
her manager is an entrepreneur called Meerschaum 
(sea foam) (Mann, 2012: 82). Was Mann trying to 
remind us of the foam on the sea from which Venus 
emerged? I suspect this to be the case, although the 
writer, as is his wont, presents a clumsily bourgeois 
Venus, seen through the lenses of irony. Her father 
is portrayed with the features of Silenus,9 and it is 
doubtless not by chance that she has an ancestor 
(her grandmother) who is French, which may be 
seen as another nod to the presence of the south, the 
Mediterranean, in Felix’s world.10 He makes wine, 
sparkling wine in this case, and the cellar is the first 
family scenario that Felix describes for the reader, 
if  we except the Rhineland countryside in which 
his home stands, whose main, almost exclusive, fea-
ture is the vineyards. And in this description the 
Dionysian pulse beats. Felix remembers how in his 
mind he addressed the rows of bottles he gazed at:
There you lie in this subterranean twilight and within 
you there is clearing and mellowing that bubbling 
golden sap which shall make so many pairs of eyes to 
sparkle and so many hearts to throb with heightened 
zest. (...) One day you will mount up to the light (...) 
and kindle intoxication and levity and desire in the 
hearts of men (Mann, 2012: 11–12).
Lines infused with Dionysian aroma, espe-
cially in their references to intoxication (Rausch) 
and desire (Lust). Silenus is the daimon of  the for-
est who cared for the newly born Dionysius, who 
gave humanity the drink that, through intoxication, 
facilitated enthousiasmos, possession by a god (Otto, 
1965: 145–149). However, Olympia, Felix’s sister, 
is not precisely divine and neither is the sparkling 
wine made by his father, Engelbert Krull, at least as 
far as its quality is concerned. It is Dionysian only 
to the extent that it produces the unconscious bliss 
that verges on drunkenness, when it is not indis-
tinguishable from it, followed in the latter case by 
a severe hangover, as Felix’s godfather constantly 
reminds Engelbert Krull. Here, once again, we have 
an indication of the writer’s opinion: “The firm of 
Engelbert Krull” –Mann writes – “laid great stress 
upon the exterior of their wares” (Mann, 2012: 12), 
which featured a flaring label concocted by Felix’s 
godfather Schimmelpreester. Trying to defend him-
self  against the latter’s criticism, Engelbert Krull 
replies: “I have to make the public believe it is get-
ting something for its money” (Mann, 2012: 13).
Deception or, if  preferred, illusion (this is how 
the wine-maker presents it). This clearly helps to 
explain the subsequent behaviour of the Hochstapler 
Felix Krull, as he has grown up exposed to such con-
duct, which is undoubtedly part of Mann’s purpose. 
However, regardless of this purpose, the fact is that 
these few lines conceal a great deal of information. 
The wine made by this Silenus is sparkling. How 
can we forget the German saying that Träume sind 
Schäume, i.e. dreams are foam? This saying also 
opens the door to the story Der Magnetiseur by 
E.T.A. Hoffmann, a writer much admired by Mann. 
Dreams, fantasy, deception, foam: gifts of Dionysius; 
a form of enthousiasmós, albeit of low quality. And 
an element of faith is implicit in it: “I make the pub-
lic believe it is getting something for its money”. We 
should not forget that the touchstone of faith is not 
demonstrable truth but what can barely be believed: 
credo quia absurdum est. Engelbert Krull’s under-
ground temple is a shrine to Dionysius.
But a new element has appeared. I have referred 
to an “underground” temple and I have done so 
because Felix Krull describes it in these terms. 
However, Dionysius was worshipped above ground. 
Under the earth only one god rules: Hades, so that, 
according to Mann, Dionysius’ gift is, at least in this 
case, a gift from Hades. And Hades is the lord of the 
underworld, the place where, according to Hillman 
(1979: 27–32), dreams belong, those dreams that are 
foam ... I shall return to this point. For the moment 
we shall focus our attention on the Krull family.
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We are dealing with a Dionysian family, as we 
have said, and this is true in a number of ways, not 
only because of the production of their Loreley 
extra cuvée of  dubious quality but also because 
of the barely concealed lust of the protagonist’s 
mother and sister (Mann, 2012: 13), and the fond-
ness of all the members of the family for festive 
gatherings, described by the protagonist as coarse 
bourgeois orgies, these being responsible to a con-
siderable extent for the bad reputation of the Krull 
family in the eyes of society (Mann, 2012: 21, 24). 
At this point I should mention that although Felix 
highlights the underhand, by no means sacred, 
nature of these goings on, he does not do this with 
disdain, but with a certain sympathy, as if  he wanted 
us to appreciate that, as they are clearly limited, 
he approves of them more than his self-righteous 
neighbours judge such gatherings. They are no less 
bourgeois and perhaps even more so, as they lack 
the Bohemian element in the Krull family; it is as if  
since childhood the concept of respectability had no 
real value for him. His family is not respectable, but 
it is fun. They do not seek the approval of others 
but their own pleasure. If  I may simplify, they prefer 
the id to the super-ego and in this way they not only 
oppose bourgeois order but also Freudian order, 
embodied in the well-known expression: “wo Es war 
soll Ich werden” (where id was, there ego shall be).
I think that at this point it would be interesting 
to make a first incursion into Hillman’s thought. 
Different forms of psychoanalysis (in this case, I 
include analytical psychology, as Hillman does) 
seem to have been guided by this principle, until we 
come to Hillman’s work. One of the most original 
points in his doctrine lies in leaving the subconscious 
alone and not trying to drag it, at any price, from the 
realm of darkness into the light. His work on sleep 
begins with the highly appropriate metaphor of the 
one-way bridge built by Freud between the world 
of day and the world of night and dreams; a bridge 
leading “from the unconscious to the city of the 
ego”; and he argues for the building of a new “two-
way” bridge which would allow us to travel inward, 
to the underworld, to learn about the dream in itself, 
without any desire to make a utilitarian “interpre-
tation”, and make it part of the “diurnal” psyche 
(Hillman, 1979: 1–6). In his opinion this would be 
the only bridge, the only route by which we could 
restore the dream’s dignity and its authentic psycho-
logical efficacy.
Felix Krull does not interpret and generally he 
does not make value judgements. He takes plea-
sure. We could say he experiences, fulfilling the 
wish expressed by Settembrini to Hans Castorp in 
The Magic Mountain: placet experiri. In his life as 
a trickster, which will take him round the world, he 
will learn a great deal, though his learning will not be 
guided by utility but by mere curiosity. In this learn-
ing there is never a “What for?” Felix Krull’s bridges 
will never be one-way. To verify this, let us see what 
Felix tells us about himself, his voice being provided 
by the puppeteer Mann, who is the one pulling the 
strings in the final analysis. In a paragraph which 
cannot fail to remind us of Psychologische Typen, 
the work in which Jung defines the two opposed and 
complementary psychological reactions to reality, 
the introverted and extroverted types, the protago-
nist wonders about the advantages and disadvan-
tages of “seeing in the world and in human beings 
something great, glorious and important”, which 
seems a priori to be closer to his own attitude and 
which would coincide with Jung’s extroverted type, 
to the extent that it may lead us to “underestimate 
ourselves”, as he recognises a few lines later.11 After 
considering it seriously, he decides that, in any case, 
it corresponds to his way of confronting reality.
It has always lain in my nature ... to consider the world 
as an infinitely tempting phenomenon, capable of 
affording such priceless satisfactions that no effort on 
my part could seem disproportionate to the rewards 
I might reap (Mann, 2012: 20).
This attitude contrasts sharply with that of his 
godfather:
Nature ... is full of corruption and mould, and I have 
been called to be her priest. For that reason I am 
called Schimmelpreester.12 Now, only God knows why 
I am also called Felix (Mann, 2012: 28). 
A predisposition to joyful openness to others, 
to the unknown, is indispensable for Felix Krull to 
pursue the existence his author has envisaged for 
him: an existence marked by a cheerful rejection of 
his social identity and perhaps more than the merely 
social aspect. As any reader of the novels can see, 
the destiny reserved to young Felix unfolds through 
successive changes in his personality. At first they 
are superficial, from Felix to Armand in the luxury 
hotel in Paris, where he begins to work on the low-
est rung of the social ladder, and then radical, when 
he adopts the personality of the Marquess Louis de 
Venosta, an impersonation to which he is amenable 
much more from an adventurous spirit of play than 
for economic or utilitarian motives.
In the book’s first pages Mann clearly indicates 
the “divine” condition of his trickster. He himself  
recognises that
I have always believed that I was ... a favoured child 
of the gods; and I may say that, on the whole, events 
do not show me to have been mistaken in this lively 
conviction (Mann, 2012: 15).13
Moreover, his godfather asks him at least once to 
be a model for the figure of a Greek god. There is 
little doubt, knowing Mann, that the god is Hermes, 
who will be mentioned specifically later, both in the 
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context of the relationship with Madame Houpflé, 
alias Diane Philibert, and in the agreement to sup-
plant the Marquess of Venosta and his first conver-
sation with Professor Kuckuck.
Trickster, göttliche Schelm, Hermes, the god of 
thieves, of fraudsters and charlatans, but also the 
psychagogue, the leader of souls, who sends dreams 
(Hillman, 1979: 89), the traveller between the higher 
and lower worlds, the messenger of the gods and, 
above all, the only one who “can tell the real truth, 
the whole truth about the soul” (Hillman, 1997: 
160). The many-sided figure of Felix Krull shows 
a different aspect of the same reality in each of 
his facets. It is a reality which is above all images 
or symbols, those of literature and its remote prec-
edent the mythical tale, and doubtless even further 
back: the image without words on which the myth 
itself  is based. And this is where the similarities to 
Hillman’s thought become evident.
Let us go to the beginning; I mean the material, 
physical beginning of the character’s earthly exis-
tence: his birth. “If  report tells true”, he says, “the 
birth was slow and difficult” (difficult for his mother, 
of course). He adds that the difficulties that made 
the use of “artificial means” (probably forceps) by 
the family doctor necessary were due exclusively to 
his inactivity:
I –if  I may use the first person to refer to that far-away 
and foreign little being– was extremely inactive  ... 
showing no zeal to enter a world which I was yet to 
love with such an ardent love (Mann, 2012: 14).
In this description Felix Krull shows at an early 
stage the remarkable detachment from self  that is to 
mark his whole life. It does not matter that what he 
says may be shared by all from an objective view-
point, as hardly anyone reflects on the relevance of 
spontaneously saying: “I was born in such and such 
a place on such and such a date ...”. From the first 
moment the self  is a problem for Felix Krull and more 
than this the result of an erroneous idea about what 
human life is. It is not difficult to see here the mark 
of “everything flows” in the words of Heraclitus, 
undoubtedly the pre-Socratic philosopher most 
admired by Hillman and also by Nietzsche.14 He and 
Schopenhauer were the philosophers most respected 
by Thomas Mann. For all these authors the self  is a 
prejudice, so it is not surprising how cautiously Felix 
uses the word beyond its purely syntactic meaning. 
But beyond the objection to the suitability of the 
term, in the description of his birth or rather in the 
interpretation of the reluctance of the newly born 
child, we find other clues:
reflection inclines me to associate this reluctance to 
exchange the darkness of the womb for the light of 
day with the extraordinary gift and passion for sleep 
which has been mine all my life (Mann, 2012: 14).
Even though the world subsequently turns 
out to delight him, that moment of transition 
from darkness and unconsciousness to light and 
conscious ness is painful and unpleasant. Uterine 
unconsciousness, similar to the underworld in a 
way, must have had something for him, something 
unknown and unknowable, related to his inclination 
to return serenely to unconsciousness through sleep. 
And when I speak unqualifiedly of unconsciousness 
and associate it with intra-uterine life, it is because 
Mann himself, as Krull, does so.
I have always fallen asleep with the greatest ease and 
enjoyment, lost myself  in far and dreamless forgetful-
ness, and waked after ten or twelve or even fourteen 
hours’ oblivion more refreshed and gratified than 
even by all the satisfactions and successes of my wak-
ing hours (Mann, 2012: 14–15).
It seems that Felix Krull can dispense without 
any regret with his diurnal conscious self, unlike 
most people, according to Hillman.15 Even in his 
diurnal world he begins to experience the self  as an 
undesirable burden from an early stage. When he 
poses in fancy dress for his godfather and notices 
that any costume suits him naturally, there being no 
need for it to be changed or for him to adapt to it, 
he recognises that he feels sad and depressed when 
the session ends and he has to put his own clothes 
back on (Mann, 2012: 31). He even comes to envy 
women when, on the occasion of his sister’s engage-
ment and forthcoming marriage, he realises that 
they can change their surname at least once (Mann, 
2012: 65). But this change, a socially legitimised 
exception, lacks the ingredient that would make the 
transformation desirable in Felix’s eyes: it does not 
infringe the rules. The woman who takes her hus-
band’s surname does not leave the sphere of social 
legitimacy; on the contrary, it confirms her mem-
bership of society, as it is established practice. What 
pleases the trickster, or Hermes, is the infringement 
of the rule, which may be playful or sacred, or play-
fully sacred. The change is not attractive except to 
the extent that it implies deceit; in this case a step 
from formality to play. Felix Krull needs a meta-
physics of deceit and, as we shall soon discover, he 
has one. Deceit is necessary for life, he maintains; so 
much so that God himself  has grafted it into him; 
this is what he thinks when he tries to understand 
how the audience attending the performance by the 
actor Müller-Rosé allow themselves to be deceived 
by his seductive, youthful appearance, achieved by 
the use of make up and prostheses, when he is really 
aged and not attractive at all. They not only allow 
themselves to be deceived, they seek deception, give 
themselves up to it, and pay for the privilege:
Evidently this shows a general need which God him-
self  has made part of man’s nature, a need which 
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can be satisfied through the faculties of Müller-Rosé 
(Mann, 2012: 40–41).
This approach is still too Christian, too mono-
theistic, in the sense this word acquires in Hillman’s 
work; but the essential fact is that in these lines a 
collective “generalised” need emerges, in the form 
of deceit, a trompe l’oeil, appearance, metamorpho-
sis and it is, moreover, linked to the idea of God. 
It is a god that has created this need or we could 
say that the need, which is collective and imperi-
ous, cannot fail to be perceived as something divine. 
From here to identifying it with a god who is differ-
ent from the single god of Christianity is but one 
step, which is already taken in the novel to some 
extent, since the god of deceit and appearance is no 
other than Hermes, the one that Felix Krull wants 
to embody, without realising it. In the philosophy 
of James Hillman’s psychology the gods are, let us 
not forget, the images through which the western 
psyche was once manifested (in Greece) and those 
that have survived among us in some sense, periodi-
cally reconquered: by Renaissance neo-Platonism, 
by Romanticism, and more recently by him ... and 
by some artists.
That we are talking, that Mann is talking, about 
this type of deceit, the sacred game, not a malicious 
trick for a selfish, earthly end, but very much the 
opposite, in the service of life and the well-being of 
the soul, is clearly formulated by Felix himself, a few 
pages later:
It is a favourite theory of mine that every deception 
which has not a higher truth at its root but is simply a 
barefaced lie is by the very fact so gross and palpable 
that nobody can fail to see through it. Only one kind 
of lie has a chance of being effective: that which is 
quite undeserving of the name of deceit, being but 
the product of a lively imagination which has not yet 
entered wholly into the realm of the actual and acquired 
those tangible signs by which alone it can be estimated 
at its proper worth (my italics, Mann, 2012: 44).
I do not believe it is possible to be more explicit, 
as I also believe that the lines in italics faithfully 
reflect the thought that Hillman will define in the 
course of his work, until he comes to what, in his 
opinion, is “the myth of analysis”,16 i.e. until he 
regards as concluded his research into the hypothesis 
that mythology is psychology and that in a comple-
mentary sense the psyche studied by that psychol-
ogy is manifested as a plurality of numinous images, 
highly active and with great power to shape events, 
which for westerners continue to have the features 
of the members of the Greek pantheon.
Remaining in the theoretical domain, let us 
now turn to other statements by Felix Krull which 
coincide with some of the main points in Hillman’s 
theory. Let us begin with its relationship to the 
importance of images. It is highly interesting that 
this topic arises in the religious domain and that 
Thomas Mann, whose background was Lutheran, 
should state that his preferences in this field were 
on the side of Catholicism. All that Protestantism 
rightly censures from a purely moral point of view 
(pomp, the display of power through beauty and 
ornament) is viewed favourably by Felix Krull, who, 
as we have said, is the only Westdeutsche in Mann’s 
pantheon and could thus have been brought up 
as a Catholic, though we should not be misled by 
this single explanation, as we shall soon see. The 
Catholic religion, says Felix,
... takes us to what is beyond the known world, works 
in it, takes it into account as far as possible and like 
no other faith explores and examines in depth its mys-
teries and secrets (...) and would whoever is ordained 
to administer the supreme mystery of this church, the 
mystery of body and blood, not be able, thanks to his 
heightened sensitivity, to distinguish the eminent from 
the insignificant in human affairs? (Mann, 2012: 76).
The mystery, the mysteries. And more specifi-
cally the opus transmutatoria of  transubstantiation, 
which Jung linked to alchemy, while he linked both 
alchemy and religion to psychology (Jung, 1960–
1983, 11: § 344–375). The Catholic Church admits 
and even encourages the worshipping of images, or 
more precisely, the worshipping of God through the 
images of the Virgin and the saints, as mediators, 
while reformed Christianity rejects them. It is hardly 
necessary to recall that Hillman called his psychol-
ogy a “imaginal psychology” but it may be useful 
to remember that the main objection raised, from 
both within and without Catholicism, to the cult of 
images is based on the risk of taking them, or rather 
those they represent, as “lesser gods”, the risk of a 
return to polytheism. It can hardly surprise us (this 
is what I meant by saying that there was more than 
one reason for the author making him a Catholic) 
that Krull considers the priest he refers to in the 
fragment mentioned to be “something of a pagan”.
But this is precisely what is most interesting 
from the viewpoint of this article; again it is not 
Westdeutsche or Catholic values that seem to have 
motivated Thomas Mann’s choice but the south 
(emphasised, as we have seen, by Felix’s French 
ancestry) and its relationship with that paganism 
which is not Germanic but Mediterranean. It takes 
us through Christian Rome to polytheistic Greece, 
a Greece that does not coincide with the country’s 
physical geography but represents a spiritual geog-
raphy (Hillman, 2000: 5), through which Hermes, 
the traveller, thief, friend of the seductive word 
and of beautiful images, passes. In his description 
of the psychological virtues of the Catholic priest 
Felix Krull, or Thomas Mann, stresses something 
extraordinarily significant, the bodily senses:
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An ear accustomed to elevated music, harmonies that 
make him envisage celestial choirs (...) An eye famil-
iarised with the most marvellous pomp of form and 
colour, representing the magnificence of the heav-
enly abode (...) A sense of smell used to detecting the 
odour of incense in places of worship, an organ that 
at other times must even have perceived the adorable 
odour of sanctity ... (Mann, 2012: 76).
I find his mention of the much neglected sense of 
smell especially important. According to Hillman, 
it is of primary importance in the psychological 
underworld, in the territory of Hades, inhabited 
only by souls that are like smoke (Hillman, 1979: 
185–188). What could the extraordinary aroma 
that was attributed to the dead body of saints (as 
opposed to the smell of putrefaction that accompa-
nies other mortals on their departure from this life) 
represent for the imaginary Christian, other than a 
pure and perfect soul-vapour? From a mere anec-
dote Felix Krull has charged through the territory 
of religion to peer, albeit for a moment, into the psy-
chological terrain belonging to the soul.
But this is not the end of his defence of the sen-
sory, so important for the purpose of this study. 
When he reflects in his writing the impressions he 
gathered during one of his early occupations (order-
ing carriages for wealthy burgers and aristocrats 
who went to theatres and restaurants at night and 
holding the door open for them while they took 
their seats) he lingers over the ambiguous look some 
ladies often gave him, and some gentlemen, a mem-
ory which prompts this subtle commentary:
What a wonderful thing the human eye is, rightly 
considered, that precious jewel among all the organs, 
when it fixes its moist gleam on another human being! 
(...) That small lump of clay set in a (…) hollow of 
bone and destined one day to become inanimate 
remains in the grave, to dissolve into watery residue, 
but is able, while it is driven by the force of life, to 
build the most beautiful ethereal bridges across the 
abyss that separates one human being from another 
(Mann, 2012: 100).
The eye; sight; intimate, radical communication 
through the image. It may sometimes be deceitful 
too, but this in no way affects the foregoing. The 
image (what else do the beneficiaries of Felix’s hum-
ble activity perceive?) as a message of that depth, 
that intimacy separated from that of the observer 
by an “abyss”. The magic of the look and the image, 
the psychological discharge that, in the essential 
model of love, is symbolised by Cupid’s dart. We are 
still clearly in the territory of the soul and, a little 
further on, we again find support for looks and ges-
tures rather than words:
Only in two facets of human contact, where words are 
not involved, or where words are no longer important, 
that is to say, in the look and the embrace, is true hap-
piness found, for only there do we have unconditional 
freedom, intimacy and a total lack of human respect. 
Everything in human dealings and contact falling 
between these two points is feeble and insipid; it is 
determined, conditional and limited by social usage 
and convention. Words rule there, a cold, opaque 
medium which, more than any other, engenders the 
submissive, mediocre morality which is so essen-
tially alien to the warm, silent sphere of nature ... 
(Mann, 2012: 100).
The word, mother of morality, is as “essentially 
alien” to nature as the superego is to the id. The soul 
does not allow itself  to be reduced to morality, social 
conventions, the dictate of words.17 The Psykhe is 
manifested in images and sensations, through senses 
whose perceptions cannot be adequately expressed 
in words and, like all sensations, they are devoid of 
morality. Elsewhere he will say that “the word is the 
enemy of what is mysterious, and a terrible repre-
sentative of what is ordinary and common” (Mann, 
2012: 132). The testimony of Felix Krull, of Thomas 
Mann, is all the more important in that he recog-
nises, a few lines later, that it is paradoxical that the 
person saying this is precisely someone who is writ-
ing, and, in the case of the real author, someone 
who has made the use of words the main task of his 
life. The sensation the seasoned reader of Thomas 
Mann has, when reading this paragraph, is that at 
the end of his life the writer has made a discovery, or 
has perhaps stated something he had already discov-
ered but kept secret. It gives the impression that this 
Hermes, Felix Krull, has brought his soul to light.
THE BODY, SLEEP AND THE UNDERWORLD 
OF THE SOUL
Let us look back for a moment to the begin-
ning of Thomas Mann’s literary career. According 
to scholars, what characterises his early work is the 
conflict between the artist and the bourgeois, the 
ethical question about the dignity of an occupation, 
literature, considered Bohemian according to the 
dominantly bourgeois attitudes among which Mann 
himself  grew up. And it is precisely at this time 
that he began to write the novel (Seidlin, 1975: 81). 
But it is no less true that his Felix Krull’s Buch der 
Kindheit, published in 1922, appeared only two years 
before Der Zauberberg, where the conflict has been 
left behind, although without reaching the level of 
self-affirmation of Joseph und seine Brüder. It might 
be thought, although it is not my intention to exam-
ine this possibility, that Thomas Mann had resolved 
the conflict quite early on, although in society he 
only ventured to present a cerebral solution. I think 
there is a declaration by Felix in the early pages of 
the story that we can interpret in this sense. He men-
tions that, when he reached an age at which adults 
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could be less concerned with him, he did not miss 
them, since it allowed him to indulge freely in his 
lonely fantasies (Mann, 2012: 10), i.e. the free play 
of his psyche. As Hillman maintains, “psychological 
living implies living in a fantasy, a story, being told 
by a myth” (Hillman, 1997: 143).
Indeed, the whole novel is an affirmation of the 
importance for life of developing the life of the soul. 
From an early stage Mann makes a point of affirm-
ing the supremacy of the spiritual over what is purely 
material. The two clearest examples of this are the 
provocation of somatic symptoms by the applica-
tion of the will and some exercises based on the 
conviction (perhaps Kantian)18 that the Gemüt (the 
soul) can exercise power (Macht) over the body by 
mere intent (durch den blossen Vorsatz). This capac-
ity is manifested on two occasions: the first when he 
describes the success of his efforts to convince his 
family, and subsequently the doctor, that he is really 
ill and cannot go to school, and the second when he 
simulates an epileptic fit to avoid military service. It 
is interesting to consider some lines from the first of 
these situations:
Medical science maintains that fever is necessarily 
the result of an infection of the blood caused by one 
agent or another and that fever cannot exist if  no 
physical cause can be identified. That is absurd (...) 
When Inspector Düsing examined me I was highly 
excited; I had concentrated my whole being upon an 
act of the will; I was drunk with the intensity of my 
performance (...) All this so heightened and enhanced 
my organic processes that the doctor could actually 
read the result off  the thermometer (Mann, 2012: 52).
For his purposes the young Krull has made a 
“European” incursion into the world of shamanic 
or yoga initiation. He has acted like the fakirs whose 
deeds (catalepsy, prolonged fasting, insensibility to 
pain, etc.) were brought to the attention of western-
ers in the travel writings of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. And we should not forget 
that Jung turned his attention in this direction in 
search of documents concerning the capabilities of 
the human psyche.
However, the treatment of sex in the novel is even 
more interesting. Human sexuality –that domain 
in which the corporal and the psychological act 
together, often in conflict; that battlefield on which 
what is natural contends with the coalition formed 
by social and moral pressure; that scenario for the 
marriage of body and soul. Felix Krull’s initiation 
in the affairs of love (taking the word in its most 
ambiguous and complex sense, as proposed by 
Mann) is probably one of the themes which most 
closely reflect the parallel with Hillman’s thought 
which I hope to demonstrate. I have used the term 
“initiation” deliberately, as what Felix experiences 
with the prostitute Rozsa is not simply learning, as 
he himself  recognises and explains. Even the choice 
of teacher is not accidental: a prostitute as seen by 
bourgeois culture is a hierodule on the symbolic 
level of the narrative, the level on which human 
being Felix Krull is the setting for the manifestation 
of a god, Hermes. Mann could have chosen an inno-
cent virgin but he doubtless knew that this was not 
the way to depict sacred sex; the virgin, and above 
all the only woman destined for Felix Krull, if  she 
existed, could not appear at the start of his journey 
but only after his initiation. It must be a priestess 
of sex who shows him what sex means from the 
viewpoint of the soul, and just any prostitute would 
not do for this purpose. Rozsa chooses to love him 
and Felix accepts because, on his nocturnal excur-
sions, when he studies the fauna of the night, he has 
already formed a personal idea, by no means bour-
geois, about the role of
... those members of the female sex who are called 
women of the town or women of easy virtue and also 
simply wenches or, in a more elevated tone, priestesses 
of Venus, nymphs or Phrynes (Mann, 2012: 129).
The reference to the “more elevated tone” could 
be applied to Krull himself, as it is well known that 
when polite society refers to the goddess of love 
or the courtesan who disarms her judges with the 
beauty of her naked body, it does so merely euphe-
mistically. With Felix this is not the case, since for 
him it is a “odd relic, full of colour, of more splendid 
times” (Mann, 2012: 86). Something similar occurs 
with another of the names given to these women, 
which is extremely interesting from the viewpoint of 
this study:
People use the expression “birds of death” to refer to 
those small owls which are said to fly at night towards 
the windows of those who are about to die, calling the 
fearful soul outside with the cry: “Come with me”. Is 
it not strange that these disreputable women should 
use the same expression when they are standing under 
a street light brazenly inviting men to debauchery? 
(Mann, 2012: 130)
Sex is linked to death and both of these to the 
soul!19 The prostitute calls her client using the same 
words as death calling the soul. Sex is like a psycho-
pomp, sharing its mythical role with Hermes himself  
and is, like him, closely associated with what goes 
beyond life, the underworld. In Krull’s (Mann’s) 
opinion, all prostitutes are “birds of death”, even if  
they do not know it and even if  they play their role 
inexpertly. However, Rozsa is not just any prostitute. 
Their first conversation takes place in a hired car-
riage on the way to Rozsa’s apartment.
... she avoided all formal ceremony; from the start 
she had that free, highly irresponsible character that 
is peculiar to dreams, in which our self  alternates 
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with shadows that do not have a life of their own, 
with products of itself, and all this in a way that can-
not occur in waking life, where each being of flesh 
and blood is effectively separated from every other 
(Mann, 2012: 135).
These lines are, in my view, crucial to defend 
the hypothesis I am putting forward. The conver-
sation with the prostitute is compared to a dream-
like experience, and the features Mann attributes to 
this kind of experience could have been taken from 
Hillman’s work: in them “our self  alternates with 
shadows which have no effective life of their own”; 
if  we interpret “effective life of their own” from the 
viewpoint of the self, this is true. They have a life 
of their own, of course, but that life is beyond the 
boundaries of the self, of the diurnal. The descrip-
tion of souls as shadows, even as shadows devoid 
of “life”, as the Greeks imagined them in Hades, is 
one of the references most extensively used and ana-
lysed by Hillman.20 And what Mann subsequently 
adds, namely that those shadows are “products of 
themselves”, confirms his conviction that the fore-
going assertion regarding the souls of sleep must 
be qualified, that the statement that they “have no 
life of their own” does not refer to their emptiness 
or non-existence but to the fact that they are part 
of oneself  (Hillman would say that one is part of 
them, or of it, the soul). However, the paragraph I 
refer to concludes with a statement contradicting 
the fragment by Heraclitus, so highly thought of by 
Hillman. “The waking share one common World 
(cosmos), whereas the sleeping turn aside each man 
into a World of his own” (Hillman, 1979: 133). 
We should not allow ourselves to be misled by the 
apparent contradiction, but allow Mann to lead us 
beyond the superficial and diurnal, to use another 
expression dear to Hillman. The writer claims that 
in the everyday world of wakefulness human beings 
are completely separated, isolated in the solitary for-
tress of their ego, while when souls speak, in sleep 
and outside it (we should remember that Rozsa and 
Felix are talking, not dreaming), we attain true com-
munication. Schiller had already proclaimed this: 
“deine Zauber bindet wieder/ was die mode strengt 
geteilt” -your magic powers join again / what fashion 
strictly did divide- (Schiller, 1992: 248) If  it should 
seem that this reference has little bearing on my sub-
ject, I would point out that when Krull begins to 
describe this first erotic experience and some less 
important adventures preceding it, he refers to the 
practice of sex as a “great joy” (die grosse Freude) 
(Mann, 2012: 59).
That Rozsa is a priestess is made clear by her 
attitude to sex, described as a “strict, almost dark 
seriousness” (Mann, 2012: 136). The fact that her 
mission, whether she is aware of it or not, is to con-
tribute to the initiation of her pupil, to his higher 
sentimental education, is recognised by him: “This 
is not only a case of refinement in love but also of 
refinement through love” (Mann, 2012: 140).
The young bourgeois man who goes to a brothel, 
perhaps accompanied by a father figure, does so 
only to learn the amatory arts, while in the case of 
Felix Krull it is a matter of furthering his education 
for life in the broadest sense, an education which he 
calls “refinement”. The definitive proof that he is on 
the right path is given by his first experience, antici-
pation perhaps, of coniunctio: “We were not alone 
and yet there were fewer than two of us” (Mann, 
2012: 135).
Although the verbal expression in this novel has 
been criticised, Thomas Mann, with his magic gift 
for words, has hit on a formula which would have 
earned the full approval of Jung and his followers. 
With it, or rather with the experience it describes, 
he rescues the main character from isolation, almost 
solipsism in the critical writing of some scholars 
(Lange, 1975: 127). If  this had not been achieved, 
it would have undermined the mythical (psychologi-
cal) task undertaken by the author, since we cannot 
forget that “the soul cannot exist without its other 
part, which is always to be found in a You”.21
His second significant relationship with a woman 
takes place in Paris. His partner on this occasion is 
the wife of a wealthy merchant, a woman who from 
a distance looks like him. Dissatisfied with her role 
as a bourgeois wife, she writes novels under a pseud-
onym and the name she chooses is that of an ancient 
goddess: Diane. In this adventure Mann decides to 
be even more transparent, as the woman compares 
Felix to Hermes explicitly. With a touch of masoch-
ism,22 she tells him to humiliate her by calling her a 
prostitute (again we have the figure of the hierodule) 
and stealing her jewels in her presence (210–211). 
This is a form of confirmation, in the Catholic sense, 
of his Hermetic condition: it should not be forgot-
ten that Hermes is the god of thieves, one of his first 
deeds being the theft of Apollo’s cattle. Felix him-
self  later declares that the only god in the classical 
pantheon of whom he knows anything is Hermes,23 
and in this declaration could lie the clue to his ulti-
mate destiny, which we can only gauge from the 
notes Mann left. It includes at least one period in 
prison, his unilateral possession by Hermes point-
ing to the risk of what Jung called “inflation” (Jung, 
1960–1983: 7, § 227–231).
FOLLOWING HERMES
But inflation, the risk of which is always pres-
ent, is probably inevitable when one has chosen the 
path of actively seeking the Selbst, Jung’s self, and 
the price one has to pay (with luck leading to libera-
tion) is death, at best death as an initiation, followed 
by rebirth.24 This is what happens to Joseph in the 
biblical tetralogy: he has to be cast into a well by 
his brothers and thrown into prison in Egypt before 
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he can fulfil his destiny (Bishop, 1999: 177). Felix 
Krull has made his choice and accepts the conse-
quences, “one day I resolved to belong only to 
myself  and give myself  over to freedom” (Mann, 
2012: 29). However, there is no affirmation of the 
ego in belonging to himself, since the essence of 
Felix Krull’s sacred game is his change of iden-
tity; we could compare him to Proteus as much 
as to Hermes. His story would seem to exemplify 
Hillman’s description perfectly:
Personality may be imagined in a new way: that I am 
an impersonal person, a metaphor enacting multiple 
personifications, mimetic to images in the heart that 
are my fate, and that this soul which projects me as 
archetypal depths that are alien, inhuman and imper-
sonal. My so-called personality is a persona through 
which soul speaks. It is subject of depersonalization 
and is not mine, but depends altogether upon the gift 
of belief  in myself, a faith given through anima in 
my worth as carrier of soul. Not I personify, but the 
anima personifies me, or soul-makes herself  through 
me, giving my life her sense –her intense daydream is 
my “me-ness”; and I, a psychic vessel whose existence 
is a psychic metaphor, an “as-if  being”, in which every 
single belief  is a literalism except the belief  of soul 
whose faith posits me and makes me possible as a per-
sonification of the psyche (Hillman, 1997: 51).
Nor do we know how his story ends, which may 
be the best thing, since this fact surrounds it with an 
aura of uncertainty which makes us feel it as pro-
foundly real, despite the fantastic elements in the 
adventure described to us. A conclusion, of what-
ever type, would surely give it the air of a medical 
or psychological prescription, while in this way we 
cannot help but feel that, when one reaches a cer-
tain depth, the self  no longer has anything to say, as 
the mystery belongs to the gods. Tadzio, der liebliche 
Psychagog, showed Gustav von Aschenbach the way 
in the Venice Lido. Forty-three years later Thomas 
Mann entered the domain of Hades for ever, guided 
by the god who had always been beside him.25
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NOTES
1. At this point I cannot fail to point out a first coincidence 
between the thoughts of Jung and those of Thomas Mann, 
as shown by the novel I shall be studying in this paper, 
Bekenntnisse des Hochstaplers Felix Krull. I refer to the fol-
lowing line: “what we call destiny and what at bottom is 
ourselves ...” (Mann, 2012: 142).
2. James Hillman is one of the most creative thinkers in the 
frame of C. G. Jung’s analytical psychology, to the point of 
proposing a new and original orientation which he called 
imaginal psychology. Samuels, 1985 and Young-Eisendrath 
and Dawson, 2008. In Spanish: González de Pablo (2002).
3. A private edition was published in 1922 and in 1923 it was 
printed for distribution to bookshops (Kern, 2006: 20). 
4. It is clear that Hillman had a high opinion of Mann’s work, 
as can be seen in these words from Re-visioning Psychology: 
“Pathologizing processes are a source of imaginative work, 
and the work provides a container for the pathologizing pro-
cesses. The two are inextricably interwoven in the work of 
Sophocles and Euripides, Webster and Shakespeare, Goya 
and Picasso, Swift and Baudelaire, O’Neill and Strindberg, 
Mann and Beckett –these but an evident few” (Hillman, 
1997: 107).
5. Bishop draws attention to the way in which Mann described 
as a “strange coincidence” the similarity between the postu-
lates of the book Der göttliche Schelm, which Jung co-wrote 
with Karl Kerényi and Paul Radin, published in German 
the same year as Krull (1954); a “strange coincidence” 
according to his declaration “I have never read Jung”, which 
research has shown to be untrue (Bishop, 1999: 166).
6. In relation with the possible influence of the said work, it 
is known that, in 1954, Mann asked Kerényi to send him 
the galley proofs of The Trickster, which was published in 
1956, and he celebrated the coincidence between the tenets 
of that book and those of his Krull. In any case, in those 
days Mann’s book was about to be published or already 
in bookshops (Bishop, 1999: 166). Attention has also 
been drawn to the influence of picaresque literature, both 
German (Simplizissimus by Grimmelshausen) and Spanish 
(Lazarillo de Tormes and Guzmán de Alfarache). (Seidlin, 
1975: 82–83).
7. Hillman points out that Jung always felt uneasy about 
the figure of Christ, to which he opposed that of Hermes 
(Hillman, 1979: 89; Jung, 1960–1983: 13, § 299).
8. As a central theme in Hillman’s work, this may not require 
any further comment, but I will mention that it finds its most 
explicit and radical formulation in Hillman, 1998: 264–266. 
9. “My father, his size and obesity notwithstanding, had great 
personal charm” (Mann, 2012: 9).
10. It has been emphasised that Felix Krull is the only 
Westdeutsche, Catholic and, in a sense, “southern” charac-
ter in Mann’s work (Seidlin, 1975: 84).
11. Later he will discount that risk, affirming that “whoever 
really loves the world models himself  to please it” (Mann, 
2012: 80).
12. “Mould-priest” is one of the many symbolic names used 
by Thomas Mann as indications of character prior to any 
description, as in the case of the protagonist of Der Tod in 
Venedig, Gustav von Aschenbach (ash-stream).
13. Later, when he describes the theft of chocolates and other 
sweets on his return from school, he will justify his action 
on the grounds that he is “a favourite of the powers that be 
and actually compact of different flesh and blood” (Mann, 
2012: 37).
14. Thomas Mann devoted two essays to both German philo-
sophers (Schopenhauer, 1938 and Nietzsches Philosophie im 
Lichte unserer Erfahrung, 1947). Besides, Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy plays a relevant role in Buddenbrooks and 
Nietzsche’s too in Der Zauberberg and Doktor Faustus.
15. “To dream is to enter the House of the Lord of the Dead, 
where our complexes lie in wait. We do not go gentle into 
that good night”. Before making this statement he has 
listed the different rituals he knows of, his own and those 
of his patients, in which people engage before going to bed 
(Hillman, 1979: 34). 
16. They are Psyche and Eros (Hillman, 1998: 55–61).
17. One of the key points in Hillman’s doctrine is the need to 
demoralise the psyche, freeing it from the “moralistic fal-
lacy” (Hillman, 1997: 352). And in this task the role of 
Hermes is exemplary, since this god “is not bound by the 
moralistic fallacy” (Hillman, 1997: 163).
18. I refer to the short work of Kant entitled Von der Macht des 
Gemüts, durch den blossen Vorsatz seiner krankhaften Gefühle 
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Meister zu sein (On the Power of the Soul to Dominate One’s 
Own Morbid Feelings Through Pure Intent) (1798).
19. The relationship between Psyche and Thanatos or Psyche 
and Hades is a constant factor in Hillman’s work (Hillman, 
1997:110, 205–208; 1979: 47, 212–213 n. 48).
20. He deals with this theme in great detail, extending his 
thoughts to the archetype of the Shadow (der Schatten) in 
Hillman, 1979: 51–59.
21. With this quotation from Jung, 1960–1983: 16, § 454, 
Hillman begins the first part of his work The Myth of 
Analysis (Hillman, 1998: p. 11).
22. Although lack of space prevents me from analysing this 
component of the relationship in greater detail, I would 
point out that in Hillman, 1998: 142–148, Hillman rescues 
masochism from the category of a vile perversion. 
23. He will do so in his first conversation with Professor 
Kuckuck, in the dining car of the train taking them to 
Lisbon (Mann, 2012: 310). He also mentions it in his con-
versation with the Marquess of Venosta, when the latter’s 
impersonation by Felix is being planned (Mann, 2012: 271).
24. “Lets us pause here to recall that the idea of rebirth refers to 
a wholly psychic phenomenon, unequalled in animal nature. 
Renaissance is a potentiality of the soul, not of nature, an is 
thus an opus contra naturam, a movement from nature into 
soul. This movement of rebirth from natural existence to 
psychological existence requires a preceding or a simultane-
ous dying (…) I believe the God of the Renaissance and 
of all psychological renascences to be Hades, archetypal 
principle of the deepest aspect of the soul” (Hillman, 1997: 
205–206). We find the same idea in Hillman, 1979: 65–66.
25. “An author’s fictions are often more significant than his 
own reality, containing more psychic substance, which last 
long after their ‘creator’ has gone. An author creates only by 
their authority” (Hillman, 1997: 12).
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